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Two stage dynamic game pricing model for natural gas pipeline transportation
SI Jiang wei 1,2, CHEN Yue xuan 2, DING Hao2
(1.Business School of Hehai University, Nanjing 210098, China;2.College of Economic Administration in China University of Petroleum, Dongying 257061, China)
Abstract:
Using two stage dynamic game theory, the game pricing under the conditions of free competition, taxation adjustment, cross subsidies and government 's limiting price was investigated for natural gas pipeline transportation industry. The relation between prices of different conditions and each parameter and the effect of different government behavior on price were also discussed. The results show that free competitions and fixed taxes have no effect on pricing. Cross subsidies would lead to higher price that is not beneficial to market growth. And the government 's limiting price is the most conventional control. The conclusion can provide theoretical basis for natural gas pipeline transportation and other product pricing of partial commonweal function.
Key words:  natural gas  pipeline transportation  pricing  game analysis